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The economic and financial crisis has prompted a substantial increase in the general gov-
ernment debt of the European Union (EU) countries to levels far higher than those prevail-
ing in the pre-2008 period. This trajectory, along with the difficulties of curbing the atten-
dant expansionary dynamics, has placed the sustainability of public finances at the heart 
of the economic policy debate in Europe. 
In the case of Spanish general government, the low starting level of public debt (36% of 
GDP compared with 66% of GDP in the euro area in 2007) allowed the initial impact of the 
cyclical downturn on public finances to be absorbed without high levels in the stock of 
debt being attained. However, prolonged economic sluggishness and the continuation of 
high budget deficits, along with the impact of assistance to the financial sector, among 
other factors, have placed the debt/GDP ratio at 84.2% in 2012 (88.2% of GDP in 2013 
Q1), though this is still below the euro area level. 
The rapid increase in public debt in some euro countries was, indeed, one of the factors that 
sparked the sovereign debt crisis that broke in early 2010. The review of the EU economic gov-
ernance framework in response to this crisis has included a reform of the Stability and Growth 
Pact (SGP), one of the main aims of which has precisely been to reinforce the disciplining role 
of the ceiling set for public debt. Along these lines, the amendment of the Spanish budgetary 
framework, set in train in September 2011 with the reform of the Constitution and its subse-
quent implementation in April 2012 through the LEP (Organic Law on Budgetary Stability and 
Financial Sustainability), assigns greater importance to this variable. In particular, it sets an ex-
plicit cap not envisaged in previous stability laws, such that its weight relative to GDP may not 
exceed 60%. A transition period to 2020 has been set for the application of this criterion.1
Against this background, monitoring public debt has become most important. This article 
analyses developments in the recent period in Spain’s case drawing on the statistics pub-
lished by the Banco de España.2 The following section first describes the different concepts 
of general government indebtedness that are habitually used. It is important to know the 
different definitions of this variable in order to be able to arrive at an appropriate interpreta-
tion, in particular when international comparisons are made. The third section has as its 
basis one of these concepts, that relating to public debt according to the Excessive Deficit 
Protocol (EDP), and recent developments concerning its determinants and its breakdown 
by agent, maturity, instruments and holder are analysed. The fourth section shows the main 
factors that have affected the so-called “deficit/debt adjustment”, which allows the figures 
for net borrowing or the general government deficit to be reconciled with those of the 
changes in the stock of EDP debt. The fifth section draws some brief conclusions.
In economic terms, general government expenditure and acquisitions of financial assets 
that are not financed with current and capital revenue (essentially tax revenue) should be 
Introduction
The different concepts
of public debt
1  The LEP also sets out the breakdown of the ceiling of 60% of GDP by general government sub-sector: central 
government, 44% of GDP; overall regional governments, 13%; and local governments, 3%. 
2  Table 1 summarises the main Banco de España publications containing information on general government debt. 
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financed through the generation of liabilities. This generation of liabilities is usually called 
general government debt or indebtedness. Under this broad definition different concepts 
may be distinguished, the boundaries of which are defined by the instruments included in 
each of them and by the valuation method. Described below are the main general govern-
ment debt concepts habitually used, whose figures for the Spanish case are compared 
(see Table 2). 
Total general government liabilities
This is the broadest possible debt heading, reflected in the Financial Accounts of the 
Spanish Economy (FASE), given that it encompasses all liabilities incurred by general gov-
Statistic Publication Frequency Time lag
State: EDP debt and jnancial 
accounts
Economic indicators (6.2 and 6.3) 
http://www.bde.es/webbde/es/estadis/infoest/e06034e.pdf
Monthly 28-30 days
General government: preliminary 
estimate of EDP debt
Economic indicators (8.8) 
http://www.bde.es/webbde/es/estadis/infoest/e0808e.pdf
Monthly 47-48 days
General government: gen. gvt. EDP 
debt with breakdown by sub-sector,  
tier of government (regional, local and 
State Funds) and instruments. Dejcit-
debt adjustments
Boletín Estadístico  (Chapters 11 to 14) 
http://www.bde.es/webbde/en/estadis/infoest/bolest11.html
Quarterly 75 days
General government: Complete 
quarterly jnancial accounts
Financial Accounts of the Spanish Economy (FASE)
(TablesŰ2.15 toŰ2.19) 
http://www.bde.es/webbde/en/estadis/ccff/cfcap2.html
Quarterly 110 days
MAIN GENERAL GOVERNMENT DEBT STATISTICS PUBLISHED BY THE BANCO DE ESPAÑA TABLE 1
SOURCE: Banco de España. 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
NOTE: Detailed data are published quarterly in Table 1 of Chapter 11 of the Boletín Estadístico and in Table 2.15 of the FASE.
http://www.bde.es/webbde/es/estadis/infoest/a1101e.pdf.
http://www.bde.es/webbde/es/estadis/ccff/0215a.pdf.
€m and percentage breakdown as at 31/12/2012
1. Cash and deposits 3,681 0.4% 3,681 0.3% 3,681 0.4%
2. Securities other than shares 669,027 75.7% 743,256 63.2% 675,928 71.0%
    General government securities — — 67,328 5.7% — —
    Other securities (short, medium and long-term) 669,027 75.7% 675,928 57.4% 675,928 71.0%
3. Cross-general government long-term debt — — 117,022 9.9% — —
4. Other long-term loans 196,490 22.2% 196,473 16.7% 196,473 20.6%
5. Short-term loans 14,675 1.7% 14,667 1.2% 14,667 1.5%
6. Trade credits and other cross-general government 
liabilities
— — 39,759 3.4% — —
7. Other trade credits and other liabilities — — 61,791 5.3% 61,791 6.5%
8. TOTAL (8=1+2+3+4+5+6+7) 883,873 100.0% 1,176,649 100.0% 952,540 100.0%
% of GDP mp — 84.2% — 112.1% — 90.8%
Liabilities of the Financial 
Accounts of the Spanish 
Economy
EDP debt
Dec-12Dec-12
Consolidated liabilities of the 
Financial Accounts of the 
Spanish Economy
Dec-12
DIFFERENT CONCEPTS OF GENERAL GOVERNMENT DEBT TABLE 2
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ernment, irrespective of their nature.3 In particular, unlike EDP debt which will be described 
below, it includes the general government liabilities that are held by other general govern-
ment sectors along with trade and other payables, which reflect, inter alia, the deferrals of 
payments due by general government sectors to their suppliers of goods and services. As 
to the valuation of liabilities, ESA 954 methodology – which employs market prices in the 
stocks and flows of liabilities in the form of securities other than shares – is used.
In association with this definition, a second concept called “consolidated liabilities” is in-
cluded. This coincides with that of total general government liabilities, but those liabilities 
held by another general government sector are stripped out. 
General government debt according to the Excessive Deficit Protocol (EDP)
This concept of debt is the relevant one for the purposes of the ceilings set in the Euro-
pean SGP and in the Spanish LEP, and is defined in Community Regulations.5 It comprises 
general government payables in the form of cash and deposits, securities other than 
shares, excluding financial derivatives, and loans. It differs from the previous concept of 
“Total general government liabilities” in that it does not include general government liabili-
ties held by other general government sectors or the so-called trade credits and other 
payables. Moreover, the methods for valuing liabilities applied in EDP debt are based on 
the use of nominal values. 
Table 2 offers a comparison of the three aforementioned definitions of debt for the Spanish 
case. Chart 1 shows the recent time path of these three definitions for Spain and the euro 
area. It can be seen that Spanish total general government liabilities amounted to 112.2% 
of GDP at end-2012 (110.9% in the euro area). Nonetheless, of this total, slightly more than 
21 pp of GDP related in Spain to liabilities of one general government sector to another, 
such that consolidated liabilities stood at 90.8% of GDP (103.7% in the euro area). Further, 
if trade credit and other liabilities – which accounted for 6% of GDP in Spain (4.7% in the 
euro area)6 – are stripped out, and an adjustment is made for the different valuation meth-
odology, that gives the figure for EDP debt (84.2% of GDP in 2012). EDP debt stood at 
90.6% in the euro area that same year. In terms of changes, the increase in EDP debt in 
the 2007-2012 period was 48 pp of GDP in the Spanish case, double that in the euro area. 
Net general government debt
Occasionally, the concept net public debt is also used. This takes general government 
debt in gross terms (which is how the aforementioned concepts of debt are defined) as its 
starting point, deducting a portion or all of the stock of financial assets, given that, from an 
economic standpoint, the general government sector could meet payment of its debt by 
3  These liabilities are coined money, securities other than shares, other equity holdings, non-trade credit, both 
short and long-term, in euro and in currencies other than the euro, trade credit and other payables. 
4  See the methodological note in the FASE disseminated on the Banco de España website: (http://www.bde.es/f/
webbde/SES/Secciones/Publicaciones/PublicacionesSeriadas/NotasEstadisticas/07/nest05e.pdf).
5  The current definition of this debt is regulated by Council Regulation (EC) 479/2009 of 25 May 2009. Among 
other things, this Regulation obliges EU Member States to send twice yearly (in late March and in late Septem-
ber) to the European Commission and, specifically, to Eurostat, the data for this definition of debt by sub-sector 
and with extensive details of specific items and transactions. These data transmissions are known as EDP Noti-
fications. 
6  There is some cross-country heterogeneity in the size of trade credit and other liabilities. In 2012 these were far 
below the average in Germany (0.1% of GDP) and Austria (0.9%), around the average in Ireland (3.1%), Portugal 
(4.1%), Belgium (4.1%), Netherlands (4.9%), Italy (5.5%), Finland (5.6%), Spain (6%), and Luxembourg (6.6%), 
and far above the average in France (9.4%) and Greece (11.1%).
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selling the financial assets – at least the most liquid ones – it holds. Table 3 presents total 
general government financial assets in 2012 in Spain. They can be seen to have accounted 
for 31.9% of GDP in terms of consolidated assets, of which around 43% related to shares 
and other equity and 25% to cash and deposits. If total consolidated assets were de-
ducted from total consolidated liabilities (90.9% of GDP in December last year), the result-
ing net liabilities would stand at 59% of GDP at end-2012. 
Contingent liabilities
General government occasionally grants guarantees on the debts incurred by other institu-
tional sectors. These guarantees are not recorded as liabilities in the general government 
accounts given that the secured debt is registered under the liabilities of the agent receiving 
the guarantee.7 However, these guarantees involve contingent liabilities for public finances, 
meaning that if the guarantee were fully or partly enforced, general government would as-
sume the debt in its entirety, a capital transfer paid to the original debtor would be recorded 
as a balancing entry and, therefore, the general government deficit and debt would increase. 
As regards guarantees granted by Spanish general government, the Banco de España 
publishes information on the value of the outstanding balance of State-guaranteed debt8. 
According to this information, the volume of these operations stood at somewhat higher 
than 17 pp of GDP at end-2012, as a result of the various guarantees granted to the bank-
ing system9, to the European Financial Stability Fund and, more recently, to Sareb (the 
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SOURCES: Banco de España and Eurostat.
NOTE: Detailed quarterly data are published in Chapter 11 of the Boletín Estadístico and in Table 2.15 of the FASE. 
http://www.bde.es/webbde/es/estadis/infoest/a1101e.pdf 
http://www.bde.es/webbde/es/estadis/ccff/0215a.pdf 
7  In addition to the guarantees granted by general government on the liabilities incurred by other sectors, there are 
other types of general government contingent liabilities of a different nature or with an associated value at risk 
that is difficult to measure. These include most notably future payment commitments in respect of spending on 
pensions and guarantees to depositors up to the established ceilings at credit institutions that participate in the 
Deposit Guarantee Fund, a unit which since 1 January 2012 has become part of the general government sector. 
8  http://www.bde.es/webbde/es/estadis/infoest/e0603e.pdf.
9  In October 2008, under the so-called Concerted Action Plan of the euro area countries, it was agreed that gov-
ernments should, for a limited period (up to 31 December 2009), directly and indirectly provide, on an arm’s-
length basis, guarantees, insurance or similar instruments allowing issues of medium-term bank debt to be 
guaranteed, the aim being to restore confidence and the sound working of the funding market for credit institu-
tions. In this connection, the Spanish government stated that, over the course of 2008, guarantees could be 
granted up to a maximum amount of €100 billion. Subsequent events led governments to successively add 
flexibility to and extend this rule. 
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asset management company for assets arising from bank restructuring) under the bank 
restructuring process10. 
Of all the definitions of public debt analysed in the previous section, that of EDP debt is 
favourably prominent in that it is defined according to uniform rules that are mandatory for 
all EU countries and it is subject to scrutiny by the European Commission (Eurostat), which 
ensures comparability across the different EU Member States. This definition of public 
debt is taken as a starting point below to analyse in greater detail comparative recent de-
velopments in such debt and its different determinants, along with its composition by 
agent, maturity, instrument and holder.
From the onset of the economic crisis, general government debt levels in the euro area 
countries moved on a sustainedly increasing course that has continued to date (see 
Chart 2). The scenario is the same in other economies, such as the United States, the 
United Kingdom and Japan. As described in the previous section, Spain has been no ex-
ception to this deterioration in public indebtedness. 
To analyse the reasons for this, it helps to break down the change in the debt/GDP ratio 
into its fundamental factors: a) the level of the primary budget balance (i.e. excluding the 
interest burden), where a negative balance of this variable translates into an increase of 
the same amount in debt; b) nominal GDP growth, where growth (reduction) generates a 
Spanish public debt 
during the crisis
SPANISH PUBLIC DEBT IN THE 
CONTEXT OF THE EURO AREA
SOURCE: Banco de España.
NOTE: Additional and detailed data are published in Table 2.15 of the FASE.
http://www.bde.es/webbde/es/estadis/ccff/0215a.pdf.
€m
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
1. Non-consolidated general government jnancial assets
    (1 = 1.1 + 1.2 + 1.3 + 1.4 + 1.5) 342,161 382,872 393,061 439,110 560,916
    As % of GDP 31.5 36.5 37.5 41.3 53.4
    1.1 Cash and deposits 101,935 119,749 95,114 77,523 84,693
    1.2 Securities other than shares 71,677 77,814 83,371 77,657 74,202
        Short-term 1,266 1,203 3,712 2,211 5,857
        Long-term 70,411 76,611 79,659 75,446 68,345
    1.3 Loans 40,608 47,970 53,714 64,611 175,652
    1.4 Shares and other equities 88,319 95,016 109,930 133,469 143,918
    1.5 Other accounts receivable 39,622 42,323 50,932 85,850 82,451
2. Consolidated general government jnancial assets
    (2 = 1 – 3) 273,145 302,074 292,689 315,316 334,853
    As % of GDP 25.1 28.8 27.9 29.7 31.9
3. Consolidation
    (3 = 3.1 + 3.2 + 3.3) 69,016 80,798 100,372 123,794 226,063
    3.1 Securities other than shares 37,274 49,776 61,015 63,247 69,282
    3.2 Loans 17,168 17,169 17,168 17,169 117,023
    3.3 Other accounts receivable 14,574 13,853 22,190 43,378 39,759
GENERAL GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL ASSETS TABLE 3
10  As regards Sareb, a unit classified under the Financial Institutions sector, its regulations specify that among its 
sources of financing will be State-guaranteed debt issued by it as a balancing entry of the assets received by 
banks. 
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reduction (increase) in the debt ratio (this factor can be broken down in turn into the con-
tribution of real GDP growth and that of the GDP deflator); c) the interest charges gener-
ated by public debt, which must also be financed, and d) the so-called “deficit-debt ad-
justment”, which reflects, among other aspects, the need to finance the acquisition of 
financial assets and, in general, all those transactions and flows that are not reflected in 
the deficit but are so in public debt, in accordance with European statistical regulations.
With regard to Spain, the change in debt in the reference period was chiefly due to pri-
mary deficits and the interest burden, which accounted for somewhat more than 70% and 
20% of the total increase, respectively (see Chart 3). The contraction in GDP contributed 
positively to the increase in debt, albeit only marginally, and the net effect of the deficit-
debt adjustment was 2 pp, concentrated above all at the end of the period. Indeed, these 
adjustments contributed to moderating the increase in debt in 2010 and 2011, mainly ow-
ing to the use of the liquidity buffers previously built up by general government.11
In the case of the euro area, the main determinant of the change in debt in the 2007-2012 
period was interest expenses, which contributed 15 pp of GDP to the stock of public debt, 
while the cumulative primary deficits contributed 7.7 pp (30% of the total), and the deficit-
debt adjustment, 6 pp (25%). The impact of the latter was concentrated, in this case, at 
the start of the crisis (2008-2010), when most interventions in support of the financial sec-
tor were made. Conversely, nominal GDP growth enabled the ratio to be cut by 4 pp, off-
setting almost 20% of the contribution of the other determinants. 
The structure of the EDP debt of Spanish general government in 2012 (see Table 4) was con-
centrated in the long term (89% of the total) and via securities (76% of the total), whereas 
holdings by residents (63% of the total) were higher than those of non-residents (37%). 
In terms of changes over time, the 2012 term structure was similar to that in 2007.12 There 
was an increase in the weight of resident holders (who accounted for 50% in 2007 com-
pared with 63% in 2012). In the case of resident financial institutions, these percentages 
climbed from 42% in 2007 to 49% in 2012. Finally, a slight increase can also be seen in 
loans, which rose from accounting for 17% of the total in 2007 to 24% in 2012.
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SOURCES: Banco de España and Eurostat.
NOTE: Detailed information by country is published in Table 7, Chapter 1 of the Banco de España Boletín Estadístico.  
http://www.bde.es/webbde/es/estadis/infoest/a0107e.pdf.
11  Given that the sale of assets enables funds to be obtained to finance the deficit without having to resort to debt.
12  However, there was a significant increase in the weight of short-term debt in 2008 and 2009, which held at 
around 18% in 2010 and 2011 and fell to around 11% in 2012. 
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From a comparative perspective (see Chart 4), short-term debt gained weight from the 
start of the crisis in the main euro area countries, as did the percentage of debt with a re-
sidual maturity of less than one year. However, the average life of the stock of debt fell 
marginally from 2007 to 2012 in the area as a whole, reflecting the reduction in Germany, 
and given the return to normality seen in 2012 in the rest of the main euro area countries. 
The proportion of total debt held by residents remained relatively stable across the area, 
though it trended unevenly from one country to another, with an increase in Italy and Spain 
and a reduction in Germany and France. 
In a context such as Spain’s, marked by the high decentralisation of its general government 
sector, it is also worth analysing the distribution of public debt by sub-sector (central gov-
ernment, Social Security, regional governments and local governments). In this case, it is 
important to take into account the debt transactions between the different sub-sectors, 
given that in some cases the increase observed in one tier of government arises to finance, 
at least temporarily, another tier. In recent years, these cross-general government debt 
transactions have essentially generated an increase in the central government debt issued 
on the market, which has been instrumental in financing regional and local government 
operations (see Box 1 for a more detailed explanation of these operations). Regional and 
local governments have thus seen an increase in their debt with central government but not 
with the markets. Furthermore, the purchase of State-issued public debt by the Social Se-
curity Reserve Fund has been commonplace, the latter being a financial asset of the former. 
THE DISTRIBUTION OF GENERAL 
GOVERNMENT DEBT
BY SUB-SECTOR
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SOURCES: Banco de España and Eurostat.
NOTE: Detailed quarterly data are published in Table 9, Chapter 11 of the Banco de España Boletín Estadístico.  
http://www.bde.es/webbde/es/estadis/infoest/a1109e.pdf.
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The unconsolidated EDP debt of the different general government tiers in Spain is addressed 
below as is, in parallel, the same debt but discounting the financial assets that each level of 
general government holds in respect of the other levels (see Chart 5). In particular, central 
government EDP debt rose from accounting for 30.1% of GDP in 2007 to 72.4% in 2012, 
posting an increase of 42 pp of GDP. However, if it is taken into account that a portion of this 
increase in central government debt was used to finance regional and local governments, the 
resulting increase after stripping out the financial assets generated by these transactions is 
4 pp lower. In the case of regional and local governments, EDP debt increased over the same 
period by 12 pp and 1 pp of GDP, to 17.6% and 4% of GDP in 2012, respectively. The debt 
of Social Security Funds, for its part, held at 1.6% of GDP. If, moreover, it is borne in mind that 
the Social Security Reserve Fund invested most of its assets in State debt, the debt of this 
sector net of these financial assets was in fact negative (-4% of GDP in 2012).
Lastly, it should also be mentioned that the Banco de España regularly publishes the debt 
of each of the regional governments together with that of the main municipal councils.13 In 
the first case (see Chart 6), an across-the-board increase in debt since 2007 can be seen in 
all the regional governments, significantly so in Castile-La Mancha, Valencia and Catalonia. 
These are also the regional governments whose debt levels as a percentage of their re-
gional debt were highest, at 28.2%, 29.4% and 25.4%, respectively. The debt of the six 
main Spanish municipalities (Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia, Zaragoza, Seville and Málaga) 
SOURCE: Banco de España
NOTE: Detailed quarterly data are published in Chapter 11 of the Banco de España Boletín Estadístico.
http://www.bde.es/webbde/es/estadis/infoest/a1112e.pdf
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2007 2012
Difference 
2012-2007
1. General government debt
    (1 = 2.1 + 2.2 + 2.3 = 3.1 + 3.2 +3.3 = 4.1 + 4.2) 36.3 40.2 53.9 61.5 69.3 84.2
2. By type
    2.1 Currency and deposits 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.9% 0.4% -0.4%
    2.2 Securities 29.7 32.7 45.0 50.9 57.4 63.7 82% 76% -6.2%
        2.2.1 Short-term 3.2 4.9 8.2 8.4 9.0 7.9
        2.2.2 Long-term 26.6 27.8 36.8 42.4 48.3 55.9
    2.3 Loans 6.2 7.2 8.6 10.3 11.6 20.1 17% 24% 6.7%
        2.3.1 Short-term 0.4 0.7 0.9 0.8 1.4 1.4
        2.3.2 Long-term 5.8 6.4 7.7 9.5 10.2 18.7
3. By maturity
    3.1 Currency and deposits 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.9% 0.4% -0.4%
    3.2 Short-term (3.2 = 2.2.1 + 2.3.1) 3.6 5.6 9.1 9.2 10.4 9.3 10% 11% 1.1%
    3.3 Long-term (3.3 = 2.2.2 + 2.3.2) 32.4 34.3 44.5 51.9 58.5 74.6 89% 89% -0.6%
4. By holder
    4.1 Residents
        Resident jnancial institutions
        Other resident sectors
    4.2 Rest of the world
Percentage of GDP Percentage of total
BREAKDOWN OF GENERAL GOVERNMENT EDP DEBT TABLE 4
18.9 21.2 30.5 35.1 44.3 52.6 52% 62% 10.5%
15.2 16.3 23.2 25.3 31.0 36.8
3.7 4.9 7.3 9.8 13.2 15.9
17.4 19.0 23.4 26.4 25.0 31.6 48% 37% -10.5%
13  See Table 13.6 of the Banco de España’s Boletín Estadístico (http://www.bde.es/webbde/es/estadis/infoest/
a1306.pdf) to obtain information on the breakdown of the regional governments’ EDP debt and Table 14.6 
(http://www.bde.es/webbde/es/estadis/infoest/a1406.pdf) for details of the debt of the main municipalities and 
other local government groupings.
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stood at €11,696 million (1% of domestic GDP) in 2012, 27% up on 2007. Of this debt, al-
most 64% was concentrated in the Municipality of Madrid.
Under Community regulations, the general government sector encompasses for statisti-
cal purposes those institutional units controlled by general government that do not cover 
more than 50% of their production costs with revenue from the sale of their products.14 
Accordingly, general government-controlled units that finance their costs in the main with 
revenue from their activity and which are in economic terms called public corporations fall 
outside this definition. The Banco de España nonetheless regularly publishes the debt of 
Spanish public corporations (which is not included either in general government liabilities 
or in EDP debt), and its breakdown into the general government sub-sectors to which 
these corporations report (see Table 5). On the contrary, there is no comparative pub-
lished information on this type of debt for all EU countries. In accordance with this infor-
mation, the debt of Spanish public corporations stood at end-2012 at 5.1% of GDP, 
around 2 pp of GDP higher than in 2007. Around 60% of this debt ratio relates to entities 
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SOURCES: Banco de España, Eurostat and Spanish Treasury. 
NOTES: Detailed quarterly data are published in Chapter 11 of the Banco de España Boletín Estadístico. 
http://www.bde.es/webbde/es/estadis/infoest/a1112e.pdf. 
http://www.bde.es/webbde/es/estadis/infoest/a1113e.pdf.
14  Further to the entry into force of ESA2010, the criteria to determine whether a public-sector producer is a mar-
ket producer shall be changed. Firstly, in the definition of costs where more than 50% thereof should be fi-
nanced by sales if the producer is to qualify as a market producer, debt interest expenses are to be included, 
having been excluded under ESA 95. Secondly, a series of qualitative criteria are to be introduced: in short, 
these exclude the possibility of most sales being made to general government units and require market produc-
ers to be profitable in the long term. 
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In recent years cross-general government debt transactions have 
emerged as a significant explanatory factor of the levels and 
changes in the debt of each tier of general government in Spain. 
These transactions have arisen essentially as a result of the func-
tioning of the regional government financing system and of the 
creation of the Fund for the Financing of Payments to Suppliers 
and of the Regional Government Liquidity Fund, which have meant 
that central government has raised funds in the market to finance 
the operations of regional and local government. This is discussed 
in detail in this box.
1 The Fund for the Financing of Payments to Suppliers (“FFPP” 
by its Spanish abbreviation)1 was designed so that central 
government might raise the necessary financing in the market 
(via issues of the Treasury and syndicated loans of the banking 
system), channeling this to regional and local government 
through loans. Specifically, with its funds it extended loans 
amounting to €26,445 million in 2012, €17,689 million of which 
were lent to regional government and €8,756 million to local 
government, which were used to pay off debts to their suppli-
ers. Thus, central government debt increased by the amount 
of the financing raised vis-à-vis sectors outside general gov-
ernment and, at the same time, the sub-central general gov-
ernment debt increased by the same amount, in this case vis-
à-vis central government.2
2 The Regional Government Liquidity Fund (“FLA” by its Spanish 
abbreviation) – which is part of central government – was cre-
ated in July 2012 to provide a credit line to regional govern-
ments3 so that they can meet outstanding debt maturities or fi-
nance the authorised net borrowing for the financial year. Since 
the FLA is classified under the general government sector, its 
debt transactions increase EDP debt. In any event, it should be 
emphasised that this increase in general government debt 
should not be higher than that arising from the regional govern-
ment budget deficit since, as mentioned above, the FLA’s funds 
are earmarked for financing the repayment of outstanding re-
gional government debt, as well as its net borrowing, meaning 
this Fund would not affect the deficit-debt adjustment. In 2012, 
the FLA lent a total of €16,641 million (1.6% of GDP) to regional 
governments that joined the mechanism. The effect of the FLA 
on the central government financial accounts is an increase in 
liabilities and EDP debt for the amount of the State’s issues in-
strumented to finance the FLA. In the financial accounts of the 
regional governments which have joined the mechanism, the ef-
fect is an increase in liabilities and EDP debt for the loans re-
ceived from the FLA, although these loans may have been used 
in part to repay previously existing debt. Finally, the EDP debt 
increases by the joint sum of the respective increases at region-
al and central government level and decreases due to the con-
solidation of the regional government liabilities which are central 
government assets.
3 As for the regional government financing system,4 in the peri-
od analysed here payments on account initially made by the 
State to regional and local government in 2008 and 2009 for 
partially transferred taxes were made on the basis of income 
projections which turned out to be optimistic in relation to ac-
tual tax receipts. This meant that the regional governments 
received higher payments on account than would have corre-
sponded to them once the definitive settlements were made. 
These differences represented around 0.7 pp and 2.3 pp of 
GDP in those two years, which they had to repay to the State 
in 2010 and 2011, respectively.
However, since these amounts are high, the Government decided 
that the payments which regional and local government had to 
make to the State be deferred so that for 2008 the amounts de-
ferred began to be repaid in January 2010 and would be made in 
a maximum period of 120 monthly instalments. The same would 
apply to 2009, in relation to which repayments began in January 
2011. The existence of these deferrals has prompted, and will 
continue to do so over the coming years, a discrepancy between 
the deficit figures in NA terms compared with cash-basis figures 
when they are analysed by sub-sector.5
BOX 1THE DEBT RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND REGIONAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
IN RECENT YEARS
1  For a detailed description of this Fund, see Box 4 of the “Quarterly report on 
the Spanish economy”, Economic Bulletin, April 2012, Banco de España.
2  In the central government financial accounts the activity of the FFPP 
was calculated as an increase in liabilities and in EDP debt for the value 
of the loan which the FFPP received from Credit Institutions. In regional 
and local government financial accounts a liability (trade credits) was 
replaced, which is not included in EDP debt, by another liability (FFPP 
loans), which is included in EDP debt. In the general government finan-
cial accounts, EDP debt grew by the joint sum of the respective increas-
es at regional, local and central government level, and decreased by the 
amount of the consolidation of regional and local government liabilities 
which are central government assets. The net final result was an in-
crease of 2.7% in the public debt/GDP ratio, whereas general govern-
ment consolidated total liabilities remained unaltered.
3  Regional government requests to join the FLA have to be accompanied by 
an adjustment plan which ensures that the budget stability targets are met.
4  It should be taken into account that the functioning of the regional gov-
ernment financing system requires payment by the State to the regional 
government of the taxes partially transferred which correspond to a spe-
cific year (t) to be made through payments on account of the definitive 
settlement. Payments on account are made during the year (t) in accord-
ance with a pre-set timetable and for amounts set on the basis of a 
revenue projection prepared in the previous year (t-1, when the budgets 
of year t were drawn up). The definitive settlement is undertaken once all 
the actual data of the financing system are known, with a two-year lag 
with respect to the relevant year (t+2). In t+2 the settlement of said year 
t is made for the possible differences between actual tax receipts and 
payments on account and advances made in t.
5  In fact, in NA terms in 2010 (2011), the total surplus amount received by 
the regional government in 2008 (2009) was recorded under the accrual 
principle as State revenue and a payment by regional government. On a 
cash basis, however, these amounts were not recorded in full, since, as 
mentioned above, the State agreed with the regional government that 
repayment be made over several years. Thus, in those two years a posi-
tive deficit-debt adjustment arose for regional government (NA deficit 
higher than cash-basis deficit) and a positive deficit-debt adjustment 
arose for the State, which meant that in the first case the increase in 
debt was duly lower than the NA deficit, with the opposite applying in 
the case of the State. Since the payment has been distributed over ten 
years, in the other years, as the outstanding amounts are repaid by the 
regional governments to the State, a deficit-debt adjustment of the op-
posite sign will duly be generated (which is negative for the regional 
governments and positive for the State).
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SOURCES: Banco de España and Eurostat.
NOTE: Detailed quarterly information by instrument and level of government are published in Chapters 11 to 14 of the Banco de España Boletín Estadístico.
http://www.bde.es/webbde/es/estadis/infoest/a1105e.pdf
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http://www.bde.es/webbde/es/estadis/infoest/a1311e.pdf.
€m
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
1. EDP debt of public corporations
      (1 = 1.1 + 1.2 +1.3) 32,120 37,422 46,077 52,037 55,056 53,317
    As % of GDP 3.0 3.4 4.4 5.0 5.2 5.1
    1.1 Public corporations controlled by general government 18,080 21,270 25,360 29,463 32,667 34,300
    1.2 Public corporations controlled by regional government 9,195 10,405 12,839 13,485 13,035 10,765
    1.3 Public corporations controlled by local government 4,845 5,747 7,878 9,089 9,354 8,252
DEBT OF PUBLIC CORPORATIONS TABLE 5
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that report to central government, while the remaining 40% belongs to the regional and 
local governments. 
The “deficit-debt adjustment” has been a significant factor in public debt dynamics and 
Spain (and in other countries) since the start of the crisis as a result of the proliferation of 
various forms of financial operations in which general government sectors have had to 
become involved in order to mitigate the market failings that have arisen and to tackle the 
ongoing recapitalisation of entities. Specifically, its value held in 2008 and 2009 at around 
the historical average (0.7% of GDP), it posted negative values in 2010 and 2011, and it 
contributed to increasing debt by 3.4% of GDP in 2012. These aggregate values are the 
result of a series of factors, occasionally counteracting one another (see Table 6). The 
main operations accounted for by these adjustments in the 2007-2012 period are de-
scribed below. 
Deficit-debt adjustments 
in the 2008-2012 period
SOURCE: Banco de España.
NOTES: Data are published for each general government sub-sector in Chapters 11 to 14 of the Banco de España Boletín Estadístico.
http://www.bde.es/webbde/es/estadis/infoest/a1109e.pdf
http://www.bde.es/webbde/es/estadis/infoest/a1203e.pdf
http://www.bde.es/webbde/es/estadis/infoest/a1213e.pdf
http://www.bde.es/webbde/es/estadis/infoest/a1303e.pdf
http://www.bde.es/webbde/es/estadis/infoest/a1403e.pdf
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€m
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
1. Change in EDP debt (1 = 2 + 3) 54677 128098 79610 91776 147380
2. Due to general government net borrowing (EDP dejcit) 48897 117143 101438 100402 111641
3. Due to dejcit-debt adjustment (a) 5780 10955 -21828 -8626 35739
    3.1 Net purchases of consolidated jnancial assets 12402 23647 -16502 -1462 13034
        Loans to Ireland Greece and Portugal under the EFSF 0 0 0 2067 15825
        Spain's participation in the ESM 0 0 0 0 3809
        Financial assistance to Greece. Hellenic Fund 0 0 2598 4052 0
        From the FROB (Fund for the Orderly Restructuring of the Banking 
        Sector)
0 9750 0 2809 6369
        From the FAFA (Fund for the Acquisition of Financial Assets) 9337 9998 -2114 -11221 -6000
        From the FADE (Electricity Dejcit Amortisation Fund) 0 0 0 10036 5764
        Shares and other equity and other assets 2246 -1902 -1072 7257 -17472
            Securities issued by foreign general government (Reserve Fund) 2842 -11428 -5518 -1013 -5040
            Other -596 9526 4446 8270 -12432
        Change in cash/deposits (excluding FAFA FROB and FADE) 819 5801 -15914 -16462 4739
    3.2 Trade credits and other consolidated accounts payable -5636 -5309 -6095 -9716 26064
        Decrease due to Fund for the Financing of Payments to Suppliers 0 0 0 0 26445
        Decrease due to reclassijcation of non-recourse factoring
        transactions
0 0 0 0 4511
        Other -5636 -5309 -6095 -9716 -4892
    3.3 Valuation adjustments and other -986 -7383 769 2552 -3359
MEMORANDUM ITEMS
1. Change in EDP debt as % of GDP (1=2+3+4) 3.9 13.7 7.6 7.8 14.9
2. Due to net borrowing (EDP dejcit) 4.5 11.2 9.7 9.4 10.6
3. Due to dejcit-debt adjustment 0.5 1.0 -2.1 -0.8 3.4
4. Effect of change in GDP on EDP debt -1.1 1.5 0.0 -0.8 0.9
CHANGE IN GROSS GENERAL GOVERNMENT CONSOLIDATED (EDP) DEBT (a) TABLE 6
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15  Royal Decree-Law 7/2010 of 7 May 2010 creating the Support Fund for the Hellenic Republic and authorising 
its endowment with an extraordinary credit totalling €9,794 million. 
European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF), financial assistance to Greece
and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) 
The Greek sovereign crisis that began in 2010, and its spread to other European countries, 
led to the launch of various mechanisms to support financing for ailing Member States. 
Initially, such financing was through bilateral loans, extended individually to the country in 
difficulty (Greece15) by the other euro area members, but the need to establish an institu-
tional mechanism to channel loans to these countries soon became manifest. As a result, 
the European Financial Stability Fund was created in October 2010, being replaced in Oc-
tober 2012 by the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). In the time it was operating, the 
EFSF issued bonds and other debt instruments on capital markets, providing financial as-
sistance with the resulting financing to countries with problems. This mechanism was con-
ceived to be strictly temporary and, on the basis of a Eurostat decision, it is not an institu-
tional unit in the true sense of the term owing to the fact that it has no independent 
decision-making capacity in respect of the Eurogroup. For this reason, all EFSF debt issues 
were attributed, in National Accounts, to the euro area Member States that act as guaran-
tors for such issues, based on a pre-established distribution key related to the share in the 
capital of the ECB, which raises the EDP debt of these countries. The euro area members 
that guaranteed EFSF issues also recorded a claim on the countries that receive the loans 
extended by the EFSF. 
The ESM, for its part, does meet the Eurostat requirements to be considered as an insti-
tutional unit. Thus, if it makes debt issues on the capital markets with a view to obtaining 
financing, the countries participating in the new mechanism will no longer attribute the 
related percentage of that debt to their liabilities. The EDP debt of the euro area members 
financing the ESM will only increase if these countries have to issue debt to finance their 
participation in the capital of ESM, a participation which shall be recorded as a financial 
asset. 
In Spain’s case, the allocation of the portion relating to EFSF debt issues entailed, in the 
2010-2012 period, an increase in EDP debt of €17,892 million (1.7% of GDP), €2,067 mil-
lion of which were allocated in 2011, and the remainder in 2012 (see Table 6). Bilateral 
loans to Greece through the Support Fund for the Hellenic Republic amounted as at De-
cember 2012 to an outstanding balance of €6,650 million (0.6% of GDP), the recording of 
which was in 2010 and 2011. Finally, Spain’s share in the ESM as at December 2012 was 
€3,809 million (0.4% of GDP). In total, then, Spain’s participation in these support mecha-
nisms has meant an increase in public debt of around 2.7 pp of GDP. 
Fund for the Orderly Restructuring of the Banking Sector (FROB)
In recent years the severity of the financial crisis has meant that government intervention 
for the clean-up and restructuring of ailing credit institutions in many industrialised coun-
tries has been inevitable. In Spain, the Fund for the Orderly Restructuring of the Banking 
Sector (FROB) was set up in June 2009 to act as an instrument for such operations. The 
main functions of the FROB are to contribute to strengthening credit institutions’ capital 
and to manage restructuring processes at troubled institutions. The FROB is classified in 
the general government sector, under the central government sub-sector, meaning its ac-
tivity has effects on public debt and on the deficit. 
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In total, the FROB’s accumulated liabilities as at December 2012 amounted to €62,407 mil-
lion (see Table 7), €39,462 million of which relate to a loan received from the ESM, 
€10,945 million to debt issues by the FROB itself and €12,000 million to contributions 
by the State funded by public debt issues. In addition, the FROB received contributions 
totalling €2,250 million in 2009 from the Deposit Guarantee Funds, charged to the eq-
uity of the latter.16 Accordingly, the cumulative effect on EDP debt of the FROB’s activ-
ity (which includes the effect on the budget deficit) accounted as at December 2012 for 
5.9% of GDP.
Intervention by the FROB was initially carried out through the acquisition of preference 
shares issued by the financial institutions involved, these instruments having been subse-
quently converted in the main into ordinary shares, with the FROB assuming the losses 
arising from the process. Further to the approval of Royal Decree-Law 2/2012 in February 
2012, the FROB has conducted most of its interventions through the purchase of contin-
gent convertible bonds (known as COCOs). 
In the National Accounts, operations involving the conversion of preference shares into 
ordinary shares and capital contributions to public financial institutions by the FROB are 
recorded as public expenditure (capital transfers paid by general government) with ef-
16  In Table 7, the contributions to the FROB by the Deposit Guarantee Funds have a negative sign because these 
funds were not part of the general government sector in 2009 and their contributions were used to finance in-
terventions without increasing public debt. 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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€m
9   
. Effect of FROB opeQations on geneQal goUeQnment debt
    ( = . + . + .3 =  + 3) 9,  ,94 44,
    As % of GDP .9 . . 4.3
    . ContQibTtions fQom the State 6,   ,
    . SecTQities isssTes 3,  ,94 
    .3 ESM loans    39,46
. Assistance gQanted with effect on the dejcit   ,6 38,343
    As % of GDP . . . 3.
3. FROB opeQations with effect onlX on debt
    (3 = 3. + 3. + 3.3 + 3.4 + 3. + 3.6) 9,  ,9 6,369
    As % of GDP .9 . .3 .6
    3. Recapitalisation of jnancial coQpoQations (incQease in own fTMds)   69 6,
    3. AcPTisition of pQefeQence shaQes and theiQ coMUeQsion into shaQes  8,69 9 6,
    3.3 AcPTisition of SAREB capital and sTboQdinated debt    ,4
    3.4 GQanting and QepaXment of loans   3,96 ,938
    3. AcPTisition of otheQ assets ,3 8, , 8,9
        Deposits at the Banco de España ,3 8, , ,3
        PTQchase of StateissTed secTQities    ,4
    3.6 OtheQ QesoTQces (contQibTtions to Deposit GTaQantee %TMds and otheQ) ,3 4 3 93
EFFECT OF FROB INTERVENTIONS ON THE GENERAL GOVERNMENT DEFICIT AND DEBT TABLE 7 
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fects on the budget deficit as at the time at which the conversion actually takes place or 
the contribution of funds is made, and only up to the amount enabling coverage of the 
losses accumulated at financial institutions whose own funds have been unable to absorb 
them. Capital contributions exceeding accumulated losses are recorded as financial op-
erations without effect on the budget deficit, but with an effect on public debt, if it is 
considered that the financial institution receiving the contribution is economically viable 
and the future profitability of the operation is foreseen to be sufficient. 
Overall, FROB interventions have entailed an increase in the general government deficit of 
€5,136 million (0.5% of GDP) in 2011, and of €38,343 million in 2012 (3.7% of GDP) (see 
Table 7). In addition, FROB operations gave rise to an effect – in this case only on public 
debt – of €9,750 million in 2009, €2,809 million in 2011 and €6,369 million in 2012. 
Fund for the Acquisition of Financial Assets (FAFA)
In October 2008, at the height of the international financial crisis, the Fund for the Ac-
quisition of Financial Assets (FAFA) was created in order to promote lending by finan-
cial institutions. It was later officially dissolved in June 2012. The FAFA was classified 
under the general government sector and, consequently, its activity affects debt (and 
the deficit). The FAFA’s objective was to provide liquidity to financial institutions by 
acquiring liabilities issued by them. The mechanism used by the FAFA to acquire finan-
cial assets was auctions. Thus, during 2008 and 2009 the FAFA called a total of four 
auctions in which it acquired claims on financial institutions resident in Spain totalling 
€19,335 million (around 2% of GDP). Since the FAFA was included under general gov-
ernment, the funds raised to acquire those bank assets increased EDP debt in these 
years (see Table 6). The assets acquired by the FAFA were redeemed between 2010 
and 2012 and the previously generated increases in public debt were reversed. Given 
that the last assets held by the FAFA matured at the beginning of 2012, and that the 
Fund was established strictly on a temporary basis, it was officially wound down in 
June 2012.
Social Security Reserve Fund and other acquisitions by Social Security Funds
of securities issued by the State
The creation of a reserve fund to meet future needs in respect of contributory benefits was 
specifically regulated for in Spain. Under this regulation most of the surplus revenue from 
the social security budget outturn of each year must be allocated mainly to acquiring 
highly liquid Spanish and foreign public debt with a high credit rating. For accounting pur-
poses, the Reserve Fund’s activities are included in the Social Security Funds’ operations. 
Specifically, this means that, if the Reserve Fund buys securities issued by the State, the 
EDP debt of the whole general government sector would decrease, upon consolidation; 
however, if it acquires securities issued by foreign general government, the EDP debt 
would not vary. In recent years, in addition to continuing to buy Spanish public debt, the 
Reserve Fund has also sold most of the foreign public debt it owned, which has been re-
placed by domestic public debt, thereby reducing EDP debt (see Table 6).17 Overall, the 
amount of securities issued by the State and held by Social Security Funds amounted to 
€59,794 million (5.7% of GDP) in December 2012.
17  In Table 6, the purchase or sale by the Reserve Fund of foreign public debt is recorded under heading 3.1, “Net 
purchases of consolidated financial assets: shares, other equity and other assets and securities issued by for-
eign general government (Reserve Fund)”, with a positive sign (purchase of foreign public debt) or a negative 
sign (sale of foreign public debt).
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 34 ECONOMIC BULLETIN, JULY-AUGUST 2013 DEVELOPMENTS IN SPANISH PUBLIC DEBT SINCE THE START OF THE CRISIS
Fund for the Financing of Payments to Suppliers (“FFPP” by its Spanish abbreviation)
As detailed in Box 1, in March 2012 the Fund for the Financing of Payments to Suppliers 
(FFPP) was created with the aim of facilitating the payment of the debt that regional and 
local governments had built up vis-à-vis their suppliers (see Chart 7 and Table 8). In order 
to understand the recording of FFPP transactions and their impact on EDP debt, note that, 
as indicated above, general government trade credits to its suppliers are not generally in-
cluded in the definition of EDP debt, although they are included in the total liabilities of 
general government.18 To repay regional and local government trade debts in 2012 through 
the FFPP, the latter had to be provided with the necessary funds, which transformed trade 
liabilities into EDP debt. Specifically, in 2012 funds totalling €27,781 million (2.7% of GDP) 
were available to the FFPP, which increased the EDP debt of general government, whereas 
the general government consolidated total liabilities remained unchanged (see Table 6).19
Trade credits and non-recourse factoring transactions
As a result of a decision by Eurostat in July 2012, the methodological treatment of certain 
trade credits in the National Accounts was modified. According to this decision, when a 
supplier of goods or services fully and irrevocably transfers its trade credits vis-à-vis gen-
eral government to a financial institution so as to bring forward payment, these liabilities, 
which were initially recorded in the National Accounts as trade credits, must be reclassi-
fied as loans extended to general government.20 The importance of Eurostat’s decision 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
NOTE: Quarterly data for each general government sub-sector are published in Chapters11 to 14 of the Banco de España Boletín Estadístico.
http://www.bde.es/webbde/es/estadis/infoest/a1101e.pdf.
http://www.bde.es/webbde/es/estadis/infoest/a1201e.pdf.
http://www.bde.es/webbde/es/estadis/infoest/a1211e.pdf.
http://www.bde.es/webbde/es/estadis/infoest/a1301e.pdf.
http://www.bde.es/webbde/es/estadis/infoest/a1401e.pdf.
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18  At the same time, the trade credits do finance the budget deficit in the various years in which they are generated, since 
the payments in National Accounts follow the accrual method (i.e. the expense is recorded in the financial year in which 
the goods or services are acquired, irrespective of the actual payment being made in a subsequent period). Therefore, 
in the years that the trade credits of general government are generated, they contribute to a negative deficit-debt adjust-
ment (since they permit a deficit to be incurred without generating EDP debt). The opposite occurs in the year in which 
the trade credits are paid, unless financing needs to be raised on the markets in order to make such payment.
19  In 2013 the FFPP continued to operate and a second phase of this mechanism was implemented in February, 
extending its objective and subjective scope and providing it with €2,600 million. More recently, in June, a third 
phase of the FFPP was approved. Among other changes, this extends the time covered by the mechanism to 
trade debts prior to 31 May 2013, therefore lengthening the previous period which was limited to trade liabilities 
prior to 1 January 2012.
20  The reason for this decision is that, in Eurostat’s opinion, when this type of financial operation is formalised the 
nature of the trade credits affected is altered, with the result that from when the obligation to pay is irrevocably 
transferred, said trade credits should be considered as ordinary loans.
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rests on the fact that loans, unlike trade credits, are a financial instrument which is part of 
EDP debt. The reclassification as loans of trade credits affected by non-recourse factoring 
transactions meant that in 2012 the EDP debt of regional and local governments increased 
by a total of €4,511 million (0.5% of GDP). This, however, does not change the total liabil-
ities of general government since these operations had already been recorded as other 
liabilities (see Table 6).
Electricity Deficit Amortisation Fund (“FADE” by its Spanish abbreviation)
Over recent years a gap has arisen between electric utilities’ generation costs recognised 
by the government and the revenue received by these companies from consumers (through 
access tariffs and regulated prices). This mismatch has been called the “tariff deficit”. 
Until 2007, this deficit was financed by the State recognising a claim favourable to gener-
ating companies (a long-term financial claim which is a percentage of the monthly billings 
from access tariffs) vis-à-vis future electricity consumers for the amount of the deficit 
generated during that year. The generating companies could thus assign these financial 
claims to third parties for the purpose of obtaining liquidity. Subsequently, from 2008 the 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
NOTE: Quarterly data are published for each general government sub-sector in Chapters 11 to 14 of the Banco de España Boletín Estadístico. 
http://www.bde.es/webbde/es/estadis/infoest/a1101e.pdf.
http://www.bde.es/webbde/es/estadis/infoest/a1201e.pdf.
http://www.bde.es/webbde/es/estadis/infoest/a1211e.pdf.
http://www.bde.es/webbde/es/estadis/infoest/a1301e.pdf.
http://www.bde.es/webbde/es/estadis/infoest/a1401e.pdf.
€m
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Trade credits and other general government accounts payable 67,993 74,451 79,607 93,308 126,042 101,549
    As % of GDP 6.5 6.8 7.6 8.9 11.9 9.7
        Vis-à-vis non-jnancial corporations and households 53,775 59,523 65,474 70,763 81,933 58,834
    As % of GDP 5.1 5.5 6.2 6.7 7.7 5.6
        Vis-à-vis general government (consolidation) 13,867 14,574 13,853 22,189 43,378 39,759
    As % of GDP 1.3 1.3 1.3 2.1 4.1 3.8
        Vis-à-vis other economic sectors 351 354 280 356 731 2,956
    As % of GDP 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3
Central government 15,805 18,511 21,948 24,411 23,384 26,826
        Vis-à-vis non-jnancial corporations and households 11,740 13,676 17,901 18,997 18,406 19,683
        Vis-à-vis general government (consolidation) 4,049 4,818 4,034 5,399 4,768 4,613
        Vis-à-vis other economic sectors 16 17 13 15 210 2,530
Regional governments 23,755 26,034 27,156 33,306 60,856 38,309
        Vis-à-vis non-jnancial corporations and households 23,164 25,488 26,612 27,184 36,663 16,709
        Vis-à-vis general government (consolidation) 455 403 430 5,949 23,893 21,340
        Vis-à-vis other economic sectors 136 143 114 173 300 260
Local governments 16,608 18,620 19,972 24,020 29,774 25,737
        Vis-à-vis non-jnancial corporations and households 16,389 18,400 19,770 22,393 24,213 21,142
        Vis-à-vis general government (consolidation) 20 26 49 1,459 5,340 4,429
        Vis-à-vis other economic sectors 199 194 153 168 221 166
Social Security Funds 11,825 11,286 10,531 11,571 12,028 10,677
        Vis-à-vis non-jnancial corporations and households 2,482 1,959 1,191 2,189 2,651 1,300
        Vis-à-vis general government (consolidation) 9,343 9,327 9,340 9,382 9,377 9,377
        Vis-à-vis other economic sectors 0 0 0 0 0 0
TRADE CREDITS AND OTHER GENERAL GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTS PAYABLE TABLE 8
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decision was taken to reform the mechanism and, as a result, in January 2011 the Electric-
ity Deficit Amortisation Fund (FADE) was created. The aim of this fund is to facilitate the 
securitisation of the deficit tariff that has built up and is held by electricity generation com-
panies. The electric utilities, which are the holders of the financial claims vis-à-vis future 
electricity consumers, obtain liquidity through the assignment of these claims to the FADE 
in exchange for transfer prices. The FADE finances the claims acquired by issuing liabilities 
guaranteed by the State.
The FADE is classified under the general government sector because it is considered that 
it does not have decision-making autonomy since it reports to an inter-ministerial commis-
sion and, therefore, its debt issues increase EDP debt. Until December 2012, the FADE 
had issued €15,800 million of debt which raised EDP debt by 1.5% of GDP (see Table 6). 
These debt issues were used mainly to finance the acquisition of financial claims which 
were recorded as financial assets.
The economic and financial crisis has prompted an expansionary dynamic in the public 
debt levels of the main developed countries, a dynamic  which still persists. Spain, too, 
has been affected by this, with the result that its public debt/GDP ratio, in accordance with 
the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP), has increased significantly since 2007 to 84% of 
GDP in 2012, although it still remains below the related figure for the euro area (91%). 
Persistently high primary deficits built up during the period are the main explanation for 
this deterioration, to which the interest burden has also contributed, albeit to a lesser de-
gree. The implementation of the various State funds to pay regional and local government 
suppliers, together with the funds earmarked for the financial system restructuring process 
and the contributions to European bail-out mechanisms, have likewise increased the EDP 
debt ratio.
With a view to the future, the Updated Stability Programme has the consolidation process 
continuing between 2013 and 2016, allowing public debt to stabilise in 2016 at around 
100% of GDP and then to begin to decline thereafter. Achieving these budget targets re-
quires considerable effort but it is essential to strictly comply with them to ensure the 
credibility of the consolidation process and to lower debt to more moderate levels.
15.7.2013.
Conclusions
